

Review

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about MPD, Daniel Dennett and Stephen Braude (among others) endorse C. But Dennett is a fictionalist about the self, Braude a kind of Kantian suprapersonalist. This is not an occasion for splitting between fictionalism and Kant. Consideration of C is the occasion for asking such questions as, Who or what copes? How is coping achieved? Is MPD's "mechanism" under voluntary control? and Are memory gaps in MPD motivated or adaptive? Answer those and related questions and we will learn how MPD is real. Its mode of reality—a point with which Dennett and Braude would agree—lies in the descriptive and explanatory details. If asked whether reality is in the details, Hacking also would agree.

Hacking offers no settlement of metaphysical debate. He charges methodological infirmity, sounds moral warning, and tells a tale, all in one book. It's a good book. It helps to make Hacking, already a contributor through several essays and articles, an important figure in the field of philosophical psychopathology (one of several fields to which Hacking actively contributes). Hacking's book deserves a wide readership in the philosophic community.

Is C true? Ever the village agnostic, Hacking does not say. However, he does notice a second question about coping that few theorists (and fewer philosophers) to my knowledge have noticed. How do patients cope with MPD? Whether or not MPD is a coping mechanism for trauma, once in the "condition," how do victims deal with the disorder? Part of the moral sadness and danger of MPD, according to Hacking, lies in offering people murky explanation—the child-abuse explanation—as preferred self-insight. Child-abuse explanation also strikes at the core of past relations with perhaps trusted intimates. "You have MPD, so you must have been an abused child." "Your father may have fondled you in your bath." Ethicists should rush in where hard science seems reluctant to tread.

GEORGE GRAHAM

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Schueler, G. F. *Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action*. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1995. Pp. 223. \$24.95 (cloth).

Schueler questions two Humean claims about motivation. The first is that desires are necessary for explaining actions. The second is that an agent has a reason to act when doing so satisfies some desire of hers.

Schueler begins by observing that the term 'desire' is ambiguous. On a "wide" reading, it is a conceptual truth that anytime someone acts voluntarily, she does so because she "desires to do so." On this reading, "I acted voluntarily because I desired to do so" is analytic (p. 33). On a more narrow reading, it is not analytic that voluntary action involves desire. Schueler calls a desire in this narrow sense a "desire proper." He characterizes desire proper as being unnecessary for the production of action (pp. 33, 35).

Schueler illustrates this distinction with a case in which a person does not want to attend a boring meeting but does so out of duty. Since the agent

attends voluntarily, (*ipso facto*) she had a desire in the wide sense to attend. Yet Schueler notes that in cases like this we sometimes say, "I have *no desire* to attend the meeting." This thing that one is claiming not to have is what Schueler calls a desire proper (p. 29).

Schueler uses this distinction to question the Humean claims. He begins with the claim that desires are necessary for explaining actions. Schueler argues that the claim is false, if it is read as involving desires proper. For desires proper are not necessary for action. This is why, according to Schueler, we can attend dull meetings even though we "have no desire" to attend. Apparently the theory will be plausible only if it uses the term 'desire' in the wide sense. But there are problems with this alternative as well. One is that the theory interpreted to involve desires in the wide sense appears to be empty and uninformative because the claim that action occurs only when the actor has a desire (in the wide sense) is analytic (see p. 48). (Schueler raises other problems for the theory; he spends two chapters on three variants of the theory and finds much to criticize about each.)

Schueler next investigates the Humean thesis that desires provide justifying reasons for action. He poses a dilemma for the thesis as read to include desires in the wide sense. If it is supposed to provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a justifying reason, then it simply seems false. For, on the wide reading, one has a desire to do anything that one does; if having a desire in this sense is *sufficient* for having a (justifying) reason, then one has a reason to do anything one in fact does, no matter how unreasonable it seems. This, observes Schueler, is absurd (p. 51). But things are no better if we take the theory as claiming that a desire—in the wide sense—is a necessary condition for having a justifying reason. One *always* has a desire in the wide sense, and so the theory would posit a condition that is always met (p. 52). Thus, the theory seems empty.

So it seems that the Humean theory of justifying reasons cannot appeal to desires in the wide sense. Suppose, then, we read the theory as linking reasons to desires proper. If we take the theory to claim that desires proper are *necessary* for justifying reasons, then it is susceptible to counterexamples, including the case of the unpleasant meeting. Schueler takes it to be obvious that in such cases we can have a reason to do something and yet lack a "desire proper." Thus, he concludes, desires proper are not *necessary* for justifying reasons (p. 59). Are they *sufficient*? Schueler argues that intrinsic desires do not *themselves* provide (justifying) reasons, although the pleasure of satisfying them might.

I think Schueler's arguments against the Humean are less devastating than they appear. To see why, consider again Schueler's case of the dull meeting. The Humean wants to rule out any case of intentional action that does not involve a desire. She can offer several cogent alternate explanations of such a case, all of which involve desires—where that term is not used in the wide sense. Perhaps when we say that "we have no desire to attend the meeting," we *really* mean that we have a desire *not* to do what we do anyway. Or perhaps we desire to do it under one description, for example, as doing our duty, but do not desire to do it under some other description, for example, as attending the meeting. So, it seems to me that the Humean has considerable room to claim that my attending the dull meeting is in fact caused by a

desire—though not one in the wide sense. Schueler shows that there is *a* sense of the term ‘desire’ such that one can act without a desire. But this does not show that there is *no* sense of the term for which it is both true and nontrivial that action only occurs via the operation of a desire. Thus, it is not at all clear that the Humean must choose between the wide sense of ‘desire’ and Schueler’s “desires proper.” Certainly there is logical space for the Humean to construct a concept of desire on which it is both true and nonanalytic that all actions are the result of desires. The Humean might then go on to claim that all reasons come from *this* kind of desire.

Although I do not think that Schueler’s book is as devastating to Humeanism as he thinks, it certainly is among the most sophisticated and sustained attacks on the Humean position currently available. Indeed, it is far too rich and complex to do it justice in a short review. Schueler has many useful things to say about the taxonomy of desires, the place of desire in practical reasoning, the practical syllogism, the relation between explanatory and justificatory reasons, and the nature of belief-desire explanation. Particularly interesting is his claim that in many contemporary Humean theories one’s beliefs about one’s desires—rather than the desires themselves—seem to be doing the real work in explaining action. And he offers detailed and useful commentary on much of the contemporary literature relevant to the Humean-Anti-Humean controversy, including work by Alvin Goldman, Daniel Dennett, Bernard Williams, Donald Davidson, Stephen Schiffer, Mark Platts, Fred Dretske, Michael Smith, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Nagel. While I recommend caution about Schueler’s anti-Humean conclusions, I certainly do recommend reading his book.

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Wallace, R. Jay. *Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments*.

Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994. Pp. 275. \$39.94 (cloth).

This careful and thoughtful book seeks to defend the compatibility of causal determinism with moral responsibility. Wallace begins by giving an account of the stance of holding another (or oneself) morally responsible. In light of this account, he goes on to ask what kinds of agents are appropriately held responsible. He argues that the best way to pursue this question is to ask what kinds of agents are fairly held morally responsible. Wallace contends that the incompatibilist’s basic point is that it is unfair to hold an agent morally responsible unless he possesses “strong freedom of the will,” which involves “the availability of a range of alternate possibilities, holding fixed the laws of nature and the facts about the past” (p. 3). Wallace rejects this contention. He argues that we can explain why we withhold ascriptions of moral responsibility without appealing to the principle that moral responsibility requires strong freedom of the will (and thus alternative possibilities, robustly understood). Wallace presents a systematic explanation of our practice of exempting and excusing agents from moral responsibility, and he points out that this explana-