

Duke Philosophy 291S / UNC Philosophy 840
Fall, 2010

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CONSCIOUSNESS SEMINAR

Tuesdays, 4:00-6:30 p.m.
Duke location: Room 204, West Duke Building
UNC location: Caldwell 213

This is an advanced graduate seminar, and presupposes a graduate-level course in philosophy of mind, or equivalent. Our purpose is to discuss recent writings in the general area of perception, consciousness, and representational theories of consciousness. The readings listed below are subject to change.

During meetings, no material will be introduced by the instructors. There will be one 15-minute presentation by each registered student—substantive, not a walk-through.

The written work will be one term paper, aiming at publication in a journal.

There will be three outside visitors: Fiona Macpherson, Susanna Siegel, and Ned Block.

CLASS SCHEDULE

UNC: August 31

The range of possible positions on the relationship between representations, their contents, conscious states, and sensory qualities.

Reading: Lycan, “Representational Theories of Consciousness”
(<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/>).

DUKE: September 7

Representational content vs. phenomenal content. Does phenomenal content outstrip representational content?

Reading: N. Block, “Mental Paint”
(<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/mentalphaint.pdf>);
F. McPherson, “Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience”
(http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_21954_en.pdf).

Recommended:

B. Nickel, “Against Intentionalism”
(<http://www.bernhardnickel.net/papers/intentionalism.pdf>).
Neander, “Toward an Informational Teleosemantics.”

UNC: September 14
Fiona McPherson's visit

Reading: (tba, papers from Fiona).

DUKE September 21

Split brains.

Reading: T. Bayne, "The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome"

(http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0019/12844/Unity_of_Consciousness_Split-brain_web.pdf).

UNC September 28

The "grand illusion." Inattentional blindness and change blindness.

Reading: A. Noë, "Is the Visual World a Grand Illusion?"

(<http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/NOE.PDF>).

F. Dretske, "What Change Blindness Teaches About Consciousness"

(<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00126.x/pdf>).

M. Tye, *Consciousness Revisited*, Ch. 7.

DUKE October 5

The cognitive penetrability of phenomenal experience.

Reading: S. Siegel, "Which Properties Are Represented in Perception?"

(<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/msKfinal.html>).

Siegel will also be giving a new paper on this at the Chapel Hill Colloquium, October 16.

[October 12: Duke Fall Break -- no class]

UNC October 19

Susanna Siegel's visit. Operationalizing awareness.

Reading: F. Dretske, "Perception without Awareness"

(<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/representation/papers/Dretske.pdf>).

DUKE October 26

The anti-content movement.

Reading: C. Travis, "The Silence of the Senses"

(<http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/content/113/449/57.full.pdf+html>).

W. Fish, *Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion*, Ch. 4.

S. Siegel, "Do Visual Experiences Have Contents?"

(http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~ssiegel/papers/SPAWN_SIEGEL_Sept1509.html)

UNC November 2

Phenomenal concepts.

Reading: D. Chalmers, "Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap"

(<http://consc.net/papers/pceg.pdf>).

K. Balog, "In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

(<http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~kbalog/Pages/Papers.html>).

Recommended: Güzeldere & M. Aydede, "Cognitive Architecture, Concepts, and Introspection: An Information-Theoretic Solution to the Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness"

(<http://cogprints.org/3746/1/introspection.pdf>).

DUKE Nov. 9

Phenomenal concepts, continued.

Reading: J. Prinz, "Mental Pointing"

(<http://www.unc.edu/~prinz/MentalPointingPrinz.pdf>)

D. Papineau, "Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts"

(<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/conceptsperspectives/Papineau.pdf>);

H. Yetter, "A Psychological Gap: Against the Phenomenal Concepts Strategy."

UNC Nov 16

Phenomenal concepts, continued.

Reading: P. Carruthers & B. Veillet, "The Phenomenal Concept Strategy"

(<http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/pcarruthers/Phenomenal%20Concept%20Strategy.htm>).

M. Tye, *Consciousness Revisited*, Ch. 3.

DUKE Nov 23

The relation between sensory states and beliefs/judgments.

Reading: D. Chalmers, "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Beliefs" (<http://consc.net/consc-papers.html>).

N. Silins, "Immediate Justification and Mediated Content" (<http://arche-wiki.st-and.ac.uk/~ahwiki/pub/Arche/SecondBasicKnowledgeWorkshop/PaperofImmediateJustificationandMediatedContent.pdf>)

UNC November 30

Ned Block's visit. Semantic externalism and phenomenal content.

Reading:

Tye, "Phenomenal Externalism, Lolita, and the Planet Xenon"
(<https://webspace.utexas.edu/tyem/www/PhenomenalExternalism.pdf>).

New paper by Ned.

Recommended: Dretske, "Phenomenal Externalism"
(<http://www.jstor.org/pss/1522899>)

Lycan, "The Case for Phenomenal Externalism"
(<http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/CAPhExt.htm>).

A. Byrne & M. Tye, "Qualia Ain't in the Head"
(<http://mit.edu/abyrne/www/qualiaaintinthehead.pdf>).

DUKE December 7

Phenomenal intentionality and internalism.

Reading: B. Loar, "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content" (<http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/concepts/loar.html>).

T. Horgan & J. Tienson, "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality"
(<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~thorgan/papers/mind/IPandPI.htm>)

Recommended: Lycan, "Phenomenal Intentionalities"
(<http://www.unc.edu/~ujanel/PhenInts.pdf>).